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Judicial Review for Ohio's Civil Servants
W ITH THE PROLIFERATION 0F ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, numerous
problems are naturally encountered. In spite of the tendency
toward problems, one would hope that in establishing these agencies,
the legislature- whether it be on the local, state, or federal level
-would do its utmost to insure uniformity within a given area.
A review of sections 119.12, 143.27, and 2506 of the Ohio Revised
Code and the relevant case law, however, reveals the Ohio legis-
lature's failure to insure that uniformity.
If one were to make a superficial survey of Ohio's Revised
Code, he would think that Ohio has but one Administrative Pro-
cedure Act: §119.12. In fact, there are several) At the outset, the
Administrative Procedure Act contains several exceptions. 2 For ex-
ample, the Act does not apply to the public utilities commission3 or
the superintendent of banks4 or the superintendent of building and
loan associations,' or in some cases the superintendent of insurance.'
Nor does the Act apply to the administrative appeals from the De-
partmcnt of Taxation.' Each of these administrative agencies is
independent and operates outside of Ohio's Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. Since the scope of this note is limited to those problems
encountered with agencies within the purview of the Act, the above
agencies will not be considered.
Where can one find the rules by which an agency governs
itself? When must an appeal be filed? With which court does one
file? What is the scope of the judicial review?
These are some of the problems which the attorney and his
client must face. But if the attorney has a client who is involved
with an agency that comes within the purview of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, are these questions answered? Regrettably, the
answer is no.'
Ohio Revised Code §143.27
There is one group of people particularly affected by the op-
eration of Ohio's statutes relating to appeals from administrative
I OHmO REv. CODE §119 (1972); see also France, The Ad-ministdtive Appeal- Ohio's furls-
disional Morass, 39 OHIO BAR 1435 (1966) [hereinafter cited as France].
2OHio REV. CODE §119 (Page 1972).
3Id.
4 Id,
7OuHo REv. CODE §119.12 (Page 1972).
See France.
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bodies: civil servants. Not only do the decisions of particular ad-
ministrative agencies affect their taxes, insurance rates, and utility
bills like those of every other citizen; administrative agencies affect
their very jobs and livelihoods.
The basic statute affecting civil servants in Ohio is Chapter
143 of the Ohio Revised Code.9 This chapter of the Code regulates
the functioning of government and its employees. Of special interest
is the section which deals with tenure of office, suspension, and
removal. 10 Even a superficial reading of §143.27 begins to illuminate
many of the pitfalls for the unsuspecting.
As §143.27 of the Ohio Revised Code indicates, civil servants
have a right to appeal a decision of their local civil service com-
mission." The section specifically provides for appeals for members
of municipal police and fire departments, and provides generally for
judicial review of the decision of the municipal civil service com-
mission or the State Personnel Board of Review12 However, for
almost 20 years (1935 to 1955), a question existed regarding the
scope of the judicial review.
De Novo, Quasi De Novo, or In Toto?
One of the earliest cases to deal with this question was Haw-
kins v. Steubenville." In this case, the plaintiff prosecuted an appeal
from an order of the city's civil service commission. The commis-
sion's order of removal, affirming the decision of the director of
public safety, was appealed to the Court of Common Pleas and
eventually to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, relying
on §486-17a of the General Code,'4 ruled that the scope of judicial
review was limited in toto to affirmance or disaffirmance of the
ruling of the civil service commission, and that the court was with-
out jurisdiction to modify the commission's ruling. Justice Day,
speaking for the court, said:
Where the court finds the cause to have been sufficient, it
is its duty to affirm the judgment of the commission in
toto. Where, however, it finds otherwise, it is its duty to
disaffirm in toto. This the full extent of its jurisdiction."s
'OHIo REV. CODE §143 (Page 1972).
"°OHIO REV. CODE §143-27 (Page 1972),
"At this point it should be made clear that §143.27 deals both with state civil servants who
are regulated by the State Personnel Board of Review and municipal civil servants who are
regulated by local civil servicce commissions.
12OHIO REV. CODE §143-27 (Page 1972).
13 134 Ohio St. 468, 17 N.E.2d 641 (1938).
11 §4 86-17a of the GENERAL CODE was succeeded by today's §119.12, OHIo REV. CODE.
1s134 Ohio St. 468 at 472, 17 N.E2d 641 at 643 (1938).
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Two years after the Hawkins decision, the Ohio Supreme Court
was again faced with the same question. Kearns v. SheriU16 in-
volved a member of the Cincinnati police force who had been
removed by the defendant city manager. The city civil service com-
mission affirmed the removal, and Kearns appealed to the Court of
Common Pleas for Hamilton County. There the court reversed
Kearns' removal, and the city manager then appealed. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the the defendant, and the
case was certified to the Supreme Court on the question of the mean-
ing of "appeal." The Supreme Court found that the legislature did
not intend the general meaning of "appeal", but had limited the
court's jurisdiction to affirm or disaffirm the civil service commis-
sion's ruling. 7 The Court was to determine the sufficiency of the
cause of removal,8 and could not modify the order of the civil
service commission. The word "appeal" may have implied a hearing
de no, but the Court found that, in reality, it was severely limited.
This restrictive interpretation of an "appeal" was used by the Court
of Appeals for Franklin County eight years later.19
In In re Fortune, 20 the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
said:
Had the legislature intended the Court to determine the
issue as though exercising original jurisdiction, certainly the
power to modify the Commission's ruling would have been
conferred, as well as the power to affirm or reverse..
. . . this court is of the opinion that, inasmuch as the
judicial review is restricted to a determination of one ques-
tion only and not a review of the entire matter, that the
case should be tried on the record taken before the Com-
mission and that but one judgment may be rendered, viz:
an affirmance or disaffirmance in tote.
22
16 137 Ohio St. 468, 30 N.E.2d 805 (1940).
11d. at 469, 30 N.E.2d at 807.
18See Landrey v. Harmon, 5 Ohio App. 217 (1916).
19 1n re Sidell, 51 Ohio L. Abs. 105 at 110, 80 N.E.2d 203 at 206 (Ct. App. 1948). Judge
Hornbeck relied on the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Kearns v. Sberrill, 137 Ohio St.
468, 30 N.E.2d 805 (1940), which defined "appeal" according to §486-l7a of the GEN-
ERAL CODE to mean a review of the sufficiency of the evidence.
25045 Ohio Op. 449, 101 N.E.2d 174 (C.P. 1951).
21 Id. at 450, 101 N.E2d at 176. The court was quoting from the court of appeals decision in
Kearns v. Sberill, 63 Ohio App. 533 at 541, 27 N.E.2d 412, aff'd, 137 Ohio St. 468 30
N.E.2d 505 (1940).
22d. at 451, 101 N.E.2d at 177; see also, Koellner v. Canton, 160 Ohio St. 504, 117 N.E.2d
169 (1954), where the Supreme Court outlined its view regarding the scope of judicial
review when dealing with civil service administrative rulings.
[Vol. 22:338
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After dealing with the issue of whether judicial review was a
de nova, quasi de nova, or in toto hearing, the Supreme Court at-
tempted to end the controversy in Sorge v. Sutton.23 In a thorough
review of the area, the Court concluded that the scope of the review
was to the sufficiency of the evidence which the commission used
in its decision that there was sufficient cause for removal, and further
stated:
If there should be a change in what to us is the obvious
and intended meaning of Section 486-17a, General Code,
[new §119.12, Revised Code] as it relates to an appeal to
the Court of Common Pleas, the General Assembly is the
agency to deal with the matterY4
The legislature responded to this problem that had been
troubling the courts- to say nothing of the involved attorneys and
their clients-by amending §143.27 to include the words "on ques-
tions of law and fact. 25
The Supreme Court in Cupps v. Toledo26 ruled that even though
a city charter provided that a civil service commission's order was
final, it was appellable under §143.27 to the Court of Common Pleas.
In addition, and more importantly for present purposes, the Court
ruled that because the appeal was based on §143.27 (now with the
addition of "questions of law and fact"), that the hearing was vir-
tually de novo.1"
This departure from the old rule, as a result of the 1955 amend-
ment, was repeated in Fugate v. Columbus28 where the Court of Com-
mon Pleas for Franklin County said:
Section 143.27, Revised Code, provides specifically for an
appeal on questions of law and fact to the Court of Com-
mon Pleas by a member of a police department in case of
removal."
In its present form, §143.27, Revised Code, retains the same
language, 0 and there has been no case overruling the proposition
that §143.27 provides for a hearing de nova in the Court of Com-
"159 Ohio St. 574, 113 NE.2d 10 (1953).
24d. at 580, 113 N1E.2d at 13.
'5 126 LAWS OF OHIO 91 - the amendment was passed on April 28, 1955, and was effective
on August 16, 1955,
26 170 Ohio St. 144, 163 N.E.2d 384 (1959).
27 1d. at 148, 163 N.E.2d at 387.
24 Ohio App.2d 147,211 NE_2d 885 (1963).
2ld. at 149, 211 N.E.2d at 886.
300HIO REV. CODE §143.27 (Page 1972).
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mon Pleas. However, in Fugate,3 the groundwork was laid for
other problems relating to the civil service appeals. It should be
noted that such appeals were for members of the police and fire
departments only, but in most municipalities today these depart-
ments do not constitute the total work force. The question then
arises as to what the appeal rights of the other municipal and state
employees are.
Section 143.27, Revised Code, provides for the mechanics of both
administrative appeals, and judicial review of those appeals, only for
the members of the police and fire departments.3 2 Specifically, they
can appeal a "suspension of any period of time or demotion or
removal . . ."I' and such an appeal to the courts must be taken
within 30 days from the finding of the municipal civil service
commission?'
All other municipal and state employees receive different treat-
ment under §143.27, Revised Code. Hence, different problems arise.
Ohio Revised Code §119.12
According to §143.27, Revised Code, public employees other
than members of the police and fire departments can administra-
tively appeal an order of their appointing authority to the civil
service commission or the State Personnel Board of Review. The
appealable orders include ". . . any case or reduction, suspension
of more than five working days or removal . . ... , On this basis
alone, police and fire department members receive preferential
treatment. The members of those departments may appeal a sus-
pension of any length of time, while all other municipal and state
employees in Ohio may only appeal suspensions of more than five
days. The statute continues:
In cases of removal or reduction in pay for disciplinary
reasons, either the appointing authority or the officer or
employee may appeal from the decision of the state per-
sonnel board of review or the commission to the court of
common pleas of the county in which the employee resides
in accordance with the procedure provided by section 119.12
of the Revised Code.36
14 Ohio App.2d 147 at 149, 211 N.E.2d 885 at 886 (1963).
32 OHIO REV. ConE §143.27 (Pagge 1972).
33 Id.
34 d.
35 Id. The author feels that the treatment other civil servants receive regarding suspensions
vis a vis the treatment afforded police and fire departments is inherently discriminatory and
against public policy. See Anderson v Minter, 32 Ohio St. 2d 207 ..... N.E.2d .. (1972);
but see, In re Locke, 33 Ohio App.2d 177 ,... N.E.2d (Cr.App. 1973).
36 OHo REv. CODE §143.27 (Page 1972).
[Vol. 22:338
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These employees can appeal orders of the appointing authority
with regard to "reduction, removal and suspension of more than
five days," but if these orders are upheld by the local civil service
commission or the State Personnel Board of Review, the employee
can only appeal orders regarding "removal or reduction in pay for
disciplinary reasons" to the court for review. It would seem that
the legislature feels that questions involving suspensions and reduc-
tions in pay for reasons other than discpline (economy, reclassi-
fication, etc.) do not warrant judicial review. One wonders if the
affected employees concur with this treatment.
Also under the aforementioned portion of §143.27, the legis-
lature has provided for an appeal to be prosecuted in the Court of
Common Pleas in the county of the employee's residence. This appeal
is to be taken "in accordance with §119.12 of the Revised Code,"
as set out above. However, the Administrative Procedure Act
(§119.12) provides that jurisdiction for appeals is to be vested in
the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County-" If an affected
employee resides in Franklin County, there would appear to be no
jurisdictional problems. Unfortunately, this is not always the case.
Hence, the question of where to file an appeal becomes critical.
This situation arose in the case of In re Removal of Zeigler.8
Zeigler was a state highway department employee who had been
laid off for reasons of economy. He appealed to the State Personnel
Board of Review which affirmed the layoff. Zeigler then filed an
appeal of his layoff in the Court of Common Pleas of Wyandot
County, where he resided. The State Personnel Board of Review
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that in accordance with
§119.12 Zeigler had to file his appeal in the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas. The Court of Common Pleas for Wyandot County
granted the motion to dismiss, and Zeigler appealed. In affirming the
dismissal of the lower court, the Court of Appeals held that:
• . . an appeal from the board from a lay off order is ex-
clusively to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
and that the order of the Common Pleas Court of Wyandot
County in dismissing the appeal must be affirmed . . .3
The court went on in Zeigler to find that the determinant of
the forum for prosecution of the appeal was whether or not the
employee had "control" over the action which precipitated the ap-
37'OHIO REV. CODE §119.12 (Page 1972).
31 1 Ohio App.2d 336, 204 N.E.2d 692, afl'd, 4 Ohio St. 2d 46, 212 N.E.2d 419 (1965).
1' 1 Ohio App.2d 336 at 379, 204 N.E.2d 692 at 694. The court a13o relied on State ex re.
Oliver v. State Civil Service Comm'n, 168 Ohio St. 445, 155 N.E.2d 897 (1959), and
State ex rel. Kendrick v. Mascketer, 176 Ohio St. 232 199 N.E.2d 13 (1964) providing
that such appeals were within the purview of §119.12, OHIO REVISED CODE.
19731
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pointing authority's order." The court said that actions of "transfer
or lay off" were appealable to the Court of Common Pleas in
Franklin County in accordance with §119.12, Ohio Revised Code,
and that "employee-controlled" actions such as discipline for incom-
petency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, or
insubordination, are appealable to the Court of Common Pleas in
the county of the employee's residence in accordance with §143.27
of the Revised Code. 1 These "employee-controlled" actions on which
the Court relied in making its distinctions are used in the Code as
grounds for reduction, removal, and suspension under §143.27 and
not §11 9 .12 2 Since this decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court
without comment,13 one might properly conclude that the Court
was affirming not only the result, but also the underlying rationale,
under this particular set of facts. The Supreme Court failed to
answer the question as to where the employee should appeal a
transfer for incompetency in a particular position or job, or a
transfer for insubordination because of a personality conflict be-
tween the employee and his supervisor.
One possible solution to this problem would be to disregard the
distinction formulated in Zeigler and to provide that all such appeals
are to be filed in the Court of Common Pleas in the county of the
employee's residence. This proposal will be discussed in greater
detail below.
Additional Remedies - Chapter 2506
Not only does the employee of a municipality have §143.27 and
§119.12 at his disposal; he also has another chapter of the Code,
2506." Under this chapter,
Every final order, adjudication or decision of any official,
tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department,
or other division of any political subdivision of the state
may be revied by the common pleas court in which the prin-
cipal office of the poltical subdivision is located . ..
(Emphasis added)
0 1 Ohio App.2d 336 at 339, 204 N.E.2d 692 at 694 (196 5).
41 Quotation marks added. The court reasoned that since §119.12 was enacted subsequent to
§143.27, §119.12 was controlling in the event of inconsistencies. The court felt this was in
accord with accepted principles of statutory construction.
4 t20-o REv. CODE §143.27 (Page 1972).
3Cases cited note 38 sy/na,
44OHIO REV. CODE §2506.1 (Page 1972); see also Vinopal, A Survey of Ohio's Administra-
tive Case Law- 1968, 42 OHio BAR 979 (1969). He may also have chapter 2505 at his
disposal See In re Locke, 33 Ohio App.2d 177 at 187 ,...... N.E.2d . at .. (Ct.App.
1973).
45 0HO REV. CODE §2506.01 (Page 1972).
(Vol. 22:338
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The review power of the courts of common pleas is substantial
in that the court may hear evidence in addition to the transcript of
the administrative agency's hearing 46 and the court can find:
. . . that the order, adjudication or decision is unconstitu-
tional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or un-
supported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and
probative evidence of the whole record . 4.. A7
The court is also empowered to:
. . . affirm, reverse, vacate or modify the order, adjudica-
tion or decision or remand the cause to the officer or body
* . . with instructions to enter an order consisted with the
findings or the opinion of the court . . . 48
Even with these broad powers of admitting evidence and rendering
decisions, the Supreme Court has found that the court's hearing is
not a trial de novo; rather, it is only authorized to determine the
legal justification for the agency's order.49
The first question which arises is whether this additional remedy
in the Code applies to municipal employees. This question was before
the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Steyer v. Szabo." In this case,
both the plaintiff and the defendant were members of the Parma
Police Department, and both had taken the examination for the
position of Chief of Police. The plaintiff received a lower score.
After some requested corrections were made by the civil service
commission, the plaintiff's score was still lower, and the defendant
was appointed to fill the position. As a result, Steyer instituted a
quo warranto suit in the court of appeals seeking a decree determin-
ing that the defendant held the position unlawfully and that Steyer
should have received the appointment. In the court of appeals, the
defendant asked for and was granted summary judgment, and Steyer
appealed to the Supreme Court. In a per euriam decision, the court
held that "the respondent civil service commission is a commission
within the meaning of . . . 2506." Since the court found that the
plaintiff had an adequate appeal at law under Chapter 2506, Ohio
Revised Code, a proceeding in quo warranto could not be substituted
for an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas as provided for in that
section of the Code.
46 OHio REV. COnE §2506.03 (Page 1972).
41 OHIo REV. CODE §2506.04 (Page 1972).
4I Id.
"Manning v. Straka, 117 Ohio App. 55, 189 N.E.2d 651 (1962); Williamson v. Township
Trustees, 18 Ohio App.2d 188, 247 N.E.2d 789 (1969); see whfu, In re Locke, 33 Ohio
App.2d 177, ..... N.E.2d (Ct. App. 1973).
s' 174 Ohio St. 109, 186 N.E.2d 839 (1962).
51Id. at 110, 186 NE.2d at 840.
1973]
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A year later, 1963, the same question was presented to the
court by a different route, in the case of the State ex tel. Fagain v.
Stork.- This case differed from Steyer in that Fgain sought to over-
turn the Columbus Civil Service Commission's order of dismissal
by writ of mandamus. Again in a per curiam decision, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that §2506 provided an adequate remedy in law,
and that writ of mandamus was precluded. 3 However, this case did
not end attempts by public employees to seek judicial review by
way of the writ of mandamus. In State eX Tel Conant v. Jones,54 the
plaintiff was suspended from the city police force, and on appeal to
the city's civil service commission, the commission refused to take
jurisdiction since, under its rules, it would only hear suspensions
of more than 30 days. Upon the commission's refusal, the plaintiff
sought a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the suit.
In affirming the court of appeals' dismissal, the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy under §2506, Ohio Revised
Code, and cited Fagain."
In State ex tel. Marshall v. Civil Service Comm'n,56 the Supreme
Court followed the precedent it had established in Fagain and Conant
in holding that an action in mandamus was inappropriate in light
of §2506. In Marshall, a member of the municipal fire department
was denied admission to a promotional examination. The denial was
transmitted through the Director of Personnel, and Marshall claimed
in his mandamus action that the denial was not a "final" order.
However, the Supreme Court found that the commission had "spoken
through" the Director of Personnel and that the denial was a "final"
order.57 Since the order had been determined to be final, the court
reasoned that Marshall had clear and adequate remedy under the
provisions of §2506 and therefore that the petitioner was not entitled
to a writ of mandamus, since such a writ can ". . . not be used when
there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law."58
One very important question that has yet to be answered is
whether a municipal employee has an election of remedies. Can he
select to file an appeal under §143.27, §119.12, or §2506, or all three?
52174 Ohio St. 330, 189 NX.2d 69 (1963).
"ld. at 331, 189 N.E.2d at 71. The Supreme Court remanded a similar decision regarding
the right to an action in mandamus in the face of appeal rights under §119.12, OHIO REV.
CODE, in State ex eel. Oliver v. State Civil Service ConM'n, 168 Ohio St. 445, 155 N.E.2d
897 (1959).
54176 Ohio St. 147, 197 N:E.2d 897 (1964).
5 d.
56 14 Ohio St. 2d 226, 237 N.E.2d 392 (1968).
IId. at 231, 237 N.E.2d at 395.
5t OHlo REV. CODE §2731.05 (Page 1972).
[Vol. 22:338
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Summary and Recommendations
What we have seen is a number of legislative attempts to pro-
vide judicial review of administrative orders that affect civil servants.
Two main points should be stressed. First, under the present
statutes and case law, members of municipal police and fire depart-
ments receive preferential treatment. At one time this may have
been appropriate, given the needs of the public's safety. However,
with greater public reliance on government to perform previously
private services, the distinctive aspects of the police and fire de-
partments begin to diminish. Not that these two departments are
not vital to the community's safety; in an urban society, however,
such services as garbage collection, water filtration, and hospital
services also affect the public safety and welfare. One wonders if
a mechanic in the police garage is considered in a maintenance pool
or if he is a "member of the police . . . department." 9 If the latter,
is there really any compelling public policy reason in modern urban
society why he should be afforded preferential treatment over his
brother mechanic who works in the streets department?6
Second, under the present state of the law, there are possible
problems of jurisdiction, and questions regarding the identity of
the statute(s) under which an appeal from the decision of a civil
service commission can be filed. There may be a possibility of
"forum-shopping" under the current situation and this, along with
other problems, could and should be cause for concern.
With the present statutes, the following example is possible.
A civil servant is an employee for the city of Cleveland and lives
in Mentor, Ohio. She is a "Clerk I" in the city water department.
After her promotion to Clerk 11, it is discovered that she is unable
to handle the new job and because her old job is now filled, it is
necessary to transfer her to another department. The employee dis-
likes working in the new department for valid reasons, and seeks to
appeal the transfer order to the city civil service commission. After
unsuccessfully appealing to the civil service commission, she seeks
judicial review of the commission's decision.
Under §143.27, Ohio Revised Code, she can appeal to the Court
of Common Pleas for Lake County since that is the county of her
residence. In addition, under §119.12, Revised Code, she can appeal
in the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County. Moreover, if
she appeals under Ch. 2506, Revised Code, she would have to file
her appeal in the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, the
county in which the city of Cleveland is located.
5 OHIO REV. CoDE §143.27 (Page 1972).
60 The author is unaware of any case deciding that particular question.
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To compound this already confusing situation, the Franklin
County Court might dismiss the action on the basis of Zeigler. The
court could do this on the grounds that her transfer was for in-
competency and therefore "employee-contrulled." Also, the court in
Cuyahoga and Lake counties could dismiss her action because it was
a transfer, and under the rule of Zeigler, the appeal should have
been filed in Franklin County. Our hypothetical civil servant could
have three actions pending concurrently, or she could have all of
them dismissed involuntarily. Should she pursue all three? Or one?
Or two? Which one(s)? Certainly, the legislature owes better treat-
ment to the government's employees.
The legislature should make every effort to reform, not merely
add to, the existing laws as they relate to judicial review of admin-
istrative orders affecting government employees. In doing this, the
legislature should treat all civil servants as equals and do its utmost
to avoid discrimination and insure uniformity. Such reform should
also provide for the same appeals procedure, including questions of
jurisdiction, regardless of the substance of the appeal, or who is
prosecuting it. One answer would be to have all appeals originate
in the court of common pleas in the county of the employee's resi-
dence. Regardless of where the appeal is to be taken it will be a
hardship on one of the parties. But it is submitted that the State
or one of its subdivisions is better able to handle the expense of
transportation, etc., than is an individual employee. This proposal
would also avoid problems concerning forum shopping, and would
avoid one court's shouldering of the burden of all appeals in the
state. In addition, this suggestion would avoid such questionable
distinctions as those between "employee-controlled" actions and
"transfer and layoff" actions which, as has been shown, may in
fact be indistinguishable, given the proper circumstances.
The legislature ought to act to correct these problems. If it
fails to do so, the growth of government will cause these problems
to occur with increasing frequency. As a result, the problems out-
lined in this note will only be exacerbated.
Donald Applesteint
t Law Review candidate; second-year student, Cleveland State University College of Law.
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